Do you think the argument from illusion requires the postulation of sense-data? Are
there other ways of accounting for illusions?
2. Must a representative realist believe that some sense-data actually resemble the
qualities of material objects? Is it enough if the sense data just represent the
qualities of material objects? Why or why not?
3. Do you think the argument from illusion requires the postulation of sense-data? Are
there other ways of accounting for illusions?
4. Is there any difference between a perfect illusion and the real thing? If so, what is
that difference?
5. Hypthothesizing the Eternal World Thought Probe in 7.2 (5th edition, pg 572-“”)
6. How does Berkeley try to close the gap between appearance and reality? Is he
successful? Why or why not?
7. How would Berkeley deal with this question: If a tree fell in a forest and no one was
around to hear it, would it make a sound? What does they say about or how does it
connect to his epistemology/metaphysics?
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